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need by [sic] adduced to prove such investment intent has
not been met here.”13  The court added, “indeed, we can find
no credible evidence at all in the record which would justify
a finding…that petitioner held his stored wheat for
investment.”14  The court then noted that “…it is taxpayer’s
status when he earned the income, not when he received it,
that is determinative.”15  The court agreed that the taxpayer’s
status might have changed upon retirement but the character
of the income did not.16
The case was affirmed on this point by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.17  The Ninth Circuit observed that the
taxpayer “…was not precluded from holding wheat as a
capital asset merely because he had been engaged in the
business of raising and selling it.”18  The Ninth Circuit then
proceeded to explain that “the determining factor is the
taxpayer’s purpose in holding the property.”19  The court
concluded that the taxpayer presented no evidence that he
intended to hold the wheat for investment; an intent to
discontinue the business does not convert stock in trade into
a capital asset.20
Asmussen v. United States
Three years after the appellate decision in Shumaker v.
Commissioner,21 the case of Asmussen v. United States22
was decided by the United States District Court in South
Dakota.  The facts are similar to those outlined in Rev. Rul.
80-19.23
In the Asmussen case,24 the taxpayers placed their 1971 rye
crop under CCC loan.  The taxpayers had made the election
to treat the loan proceeds as income.25  The rye crop was
later redeemed and held three years before sale by the
taxpayers.
The court noted that “because the rye was raised on the
plaintiff’s farm, without the CCC redemption, there could be
no capital gains treatment.  The rye would properly be held
by the plaintiffs ‘primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of [their] trade or business,’ and plaintiffs
would not be entitled to a refund despite the presence of
other facts indicative of investment intent.”26  The court then
proceeded to hold that “the taxpayers had a subjective intent
to treat the rye as an investment.”  In support of that
conclusion, the court cited three factors—(1) the crop was
segregated from the taxpayer’s trade or business property
(the crop was stored in 23 bins); (2) the difference between
the redemption price and the market price was slight at the
time of redemption; (3) the plaintiff’s accountant had
advised that capital gain treatment would be available on
later sale; and (4) the redemption and subsequent holding of
the crop were “isolated” transactions.
The court did not cite the case of Shumaker v.
Commissioner27 which had been decided more than three
years earlier.
In conclusion
Both the Shumaker court28 and the Asmussen court29 agree
that intent is the key factor in determining whether a crop
can be held for investment as a capital asset.  Anyone
wanting to lay the foundation for capital gains treatment
needs to develop a factual basis supporting a showing of
intent to hold the crop for investment rather than for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business.
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 4 Harl, Agricultural Law § 27.02[2] (2000);
Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 4.01[1][a] (2000).
2 See notes 3-10 infra.
3 Treas. R g. § 1.61-4(a)(1).
4 1980-1 C.B. 185.
5 I.R.C. § 77(a).
6 Rev. Rul. 80-19, 1980-1 C.B. 185.
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8 I.R.C. § 1721(a)(1).
9 Gamble v. Comm’r, 242 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1957).
10 Rev. Rul. 80-19, 1980-1 C.B. 185.
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12 See Shumaker v. Comm’r, 648 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ANIMALS
DOGS. The plaintiff owned two dogs which wandered on
to the defendant’s property. The defendant had recently lost
some sheep to an animal attack and was watching the flock
the next night when the defendant saw the plaintiff’s dogs in
with the sheep. Although the defendant did not see the dogs
attack the sheep and the defendant was able to capture the
dogs easily, the defendant claimed that the dogs were
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chasing the sheep. The defendant knew the dogs belonged to
the plaintiff but did not attempt to contact the plaintiff. The
defendant declined a sheriff’s offer to take the dogs to an
animal shelter. Instead, the defendant visited two
veterinarians over three hours in an attempt to euthanize the
dogs. The second veterinarian agreed to euthanize the dogs
but only after the defendant claimed that the dogs belonged
to the defendant. The court noted that the defendant’s sheep
were attacked again several nights later. The plaintiff sued
for the loss of the dogs and the defendant cited Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 273.030 as allowing the defendant to kill the dogs
because they attacked the defendant’s sheep. The court held
that the trial court had sufficient evidence to support the
award for the plaintiff because the defendant failed to
demonstrate that the dogs were chasing or attacking the
sheep when they were killed. The court noted that the
defendant was easily able to remove the dogs from the sheep
area and control them. The court also upheld the trial court’s
award of punitive damages for the defendant’s extreme
efforts to have the dogs killed without any evidence that the
dogs attacked the sheep and without any attempt to contact
the dogs’ known owner. Propes v. Griffith, 25 S.W.3d 544
(Mo. Ct. App. 200).
BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
Note: Chapter 12 authorizing law expired on June 30,
2000, although renewal legislation is pending.
MODIFICATION OF PLAN. The debtors had filed for a
previous individual Chapter 12 case but were in default of
the plan provisions for failure to make a scheduled plan
payment and to pay real estate taxes on their property. The
debtors filed a second Chapter 12 case as a partnership
before the individual Chapter 12 case was dismissed. A
creditor objected to the second filing as an attempt to modify
the debtors’ obligations covered by the first plan. The court
held that the second case was dismissed for cause because
the debtors could not modify the first plan and could not use
a second filing to circumvent the first plan. In re Harry &
Larry Maronde Partnership, 256 B.R. 913 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 2000).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
TAX LIEN . The debtor was an attorney and the estate
included the law practice assets, including work in progress.
The debtor purchased these assets from the bankruptcy
estate. The IRS had filed a claim for unpaid taxes and argued
that the law practice assets were subject to a tax lien filed
pre-petition for the tax claim. The trustee argued that the lien
did not attach to the work in progress because the value was
too contingent. The court held that, under California law, the
work in progress was a property interest of the debtor and




CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM . The CCC
has issued proposed regulations amending the Conservation
Reserve Program (CRP) regulations to provide, under certain
conditions, for equitable relief to producers who violated
ir contract based on a good faith reliance on the action or
advice of certain USDA representatives, or while attempting
to comply with their contract. It will also provide that CRP
contracts will not be terminated for failure to plant cover
when that failure was due to excess rainfall or flooding. 66
Fed. Reg. 15048 (March 15, 2001).
CROP INSURANCE . The plaintiff had purchased federal
crop insurance from the defendant and filed a claim for crop
losses. The defendant denied the claim on the basis that the
land involved had not been planted and harvested in any of
the three years before the year of the claimed loss. The
plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract, misrepresentation,
suppression, bad faith, negligent and wanton distribution of
information and negligent and wanton supervision of agents.
The defendant argued that the claims were subject to
mandatory arbitration under the insurance contract and pre-
empted by the Federal Crop Insurance Act (FCIA). The
court held that the arbitration provision was enforceable and
binding on the plaintiff as to factual determinations such as
whether the plaintiff had planted and harvested a crop in the
pr vious three years on the land involved but that, once the
arbitration decision was reached, the remaining claims could
be reviewed by a court. The court held that only actions
against the Risk Management Agency (formerly FCIC) or
USDA were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Nobles v. Rural Community Ins. Services,
122 F. Supp.2d 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2000).
DISASTER ASSISTANCE. The CCC has issued final
regulations implementing the 2000 crop disaster program.
 2000 program rules include additional eligible crop loss
causes not covered in the 1998 program. 66 Fed. Reg. 15975
(March 21, 2001), adding 7 C.F.R. Part 1480.
GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS . The
plaintiff granted a license to the defendant to sell genetically
modified soybean seeds using the plaintiff's technology and
claimed that the license ended when the defendant was
merged into a subsidiary of another company.  The court
agreed with the plaintiff and granted the plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment on the license termination issue.
However, the court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the issue of damages, ruling that the
plaintiff was not entitled to any damages for alleged breach
of the license agreements.  The defendant is expected to file
an appeal on the license termination issue with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Monsanto Co. v.
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., No. 4:99CV1917-
DJS (E.D. Mo. Mar. 20, 2001).
“MAD COW” DISEASE. In 1997, the FDA adopted 21
C.F.R. § 589.2000 which prohibited the feeding of protein
derived from mammals to cattle and other ruminants. It is
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suspected that Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (“Mad
Cow” disease) can be spread by feeding protein from
infected animals to other animals. Livestock packers,
auctions and other cattle handlers are requiring producers to
certify that their cattle have been fed in compliance with the
regulations. With the seizure of a flock of sheep in Vermont
believed to be infected with the disease, certification efforts
are expected to increase and stricter regulatory compliance
will be required from producers. A sample certificate of
compliance provided by the Dunlop, Iowa, Livestock
Auction follows:
“The undersigned certifies that, to the best of his/her/its
knowledge, as of the date of shipment or delivery, none of the
livestock shipped to or delivered to Ipswitch Livestock
Auction, Ipswitch, IA, will be, on such date, adulterated within
the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (i.e.,
none of the cattle or other ruminants will have been fed any
feed containing protein derived from mammalian tissues, e.g.,
meat and bone meal, as that term is defined in 21 C.F.R. §
589.2000 and none of the livestock will have an illegal level of
drug residues). This certificate shall remain in full force and
effect until revoked in writing by the undersigned seller and
such revocation is delivered to Ipswitch Livestock Auction,
Ipswitch, IA.
Date: ________________ Seller:___________________”
MARKETING ASSISTANCE . The CCC has adopted as
final regulations implementing provisions of the Agriculture,
Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2001, related to the
Dairy and Cranberry Market Assistance Programs, the
Honey Marketing Assistance Loan and LDP Program, the
Sugar Program and payment limitations for marketing loan
gains and loan deficiency payments. 66 Fed. Reg. 15171
(March 15, 2001).
MILK . The AMS has issued a notice of revisions to the
United States Standards for Grades of Dry Whole Milk. The
changes will: (1) lower the maximum bacterial estimate to
not more than 10,000 per gram for U.S. Extra Grade and not
more than 50,000 per gram for U.S. Standard Grade, (2)
include protein content as an optional test, (3) incorporate
maximum titratable acidity requirements, (4) expand the
“Test methods” section to allow product evaluation using the
latest methods included in the Standard Methods for the
Examination of Dairy Products, in the Official Methods of
Analysis of the Association of Official Analytical Chemists,
and in standards developed by the International Dairy
Federation, (5) reference the Food and Drug
Administration's standards of identity for dry whole milk,
and (6) relocate information concerning the optional oxygen
content determination. 66 Fed. Reg. 14874 (March 14,
2001).
The CCC has issued final regulations implementing
provisions of the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and
Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2001, related to the Dairy Price Support, Dairy
Recourse Loan, Livestock Assistance, American Indian
Livestock Feed, and Pasture Recovery Programs. Dairy price
support is extended through calendar year 2001 and dairy
recourse loans are postponed until January, 2002. The LAP
and PRP are being extended to cover disaster-related losses
that occurred in calendar year 2000 and the AILFP was




No items this issue.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
PROPOSED LEGISLATION . Legislation has been
introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives to include
contiguous farm land and buildings as part of the personal
r sidence for purposes of the exclusion of gain under I.R.C.
§ 121 from the sale of a personal residence. H.R. 900.
BAD DEBTS. The taxpayers, husband and wife, made
advances to the wife’s son over several years for business
and personal expenses. During this time, the taxpayers did
not execute any loan documents or require collateral for the
advances. The evidence also showed that the son was in
financial difficulty and the taxpayers had little hope of
repayment. The court upheld the IRS disallowance of the
bad debt deduction, holding that the advances were made
with compassion and generosity but not part of a creditor-
debtor relationship. The appellate court affirmed in an
opinion designated as not for publication. Kidder v.
Comm’r, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,258 (9th Cir.
2001), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1999-345.
DEPRECIATION- ALM § 4.03[4].* The taxpayer
constructed a raised floor above the normal floor of a
building in order to provide space for computer wiring. The
taxpayer treated the floor as 5-year recovery property under
the asset class 00.12 “information systems.” In FSA Ltr. Rul.
200033002, April 17, 2000, the IRS agreed that the raised
floor was depreciable personal property and determined that,
absent further factual findings, the floor was properly
characterized under an activity category, asset class 57.0
“Distributive Trades and Services, and depreciable as 5-year
property. See Rev. Rul. 74-391, 1974-2 C.B. 9. In a
subsequent ruling, the IRS reconsidered the facts and found
that the raised floor was substantially different from the
raised floor in Rev. Rul. 74-391 in that (1) no existing
flooring was placed under the raised floor; (2) the raised
floor covered 90 percent of one floor of the building; (3) the
floor was integrated into the overall design and other
building original components were designed to
accommodate the raised floor; (4) removal of the flooring
would require substantial remodeling, including
repositioning of plumbing and other wiring; and (5) only a
small portion of the raised floor would be used for computer
wiring. The IRS ruled that the raised floor was a structural
component of the building and had to be depreciated as part
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of the building. FSA Ltr. Rul. 200110001, September 13,
2000.
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On March 5, 2001, the
President determined that certain areas in Alabama were
eligible for assistance under the Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of a
severe storms and flooding on February 16-17, 2001.
FEMA-1362-DR. On March 13, 2001, the President
determined that certain areas in Arkansas were eligible for
assistance under the Act as a result of a severe storms and
flooding on February 14, 2001. FEMA-1363-DR.
Accordingly, a taxpayer who sustained a loss attributable to
the disasters may deduct the loss on his or her 2000 federal
income tax return.
HOBBY LOSSES.  The taxpayers purchased an 85 acre
farm which was covered with trees. The taxpayers cleared
most of the farm, built a residence on the property and
started a tree farm. The taxpayers had nonfarm income from
wages and a pension. The court held that the tree farm was
not operated with an intent to make a profit because (1) the
taxpayers did not keep full and accurate records sufficient to
determine the profitability of the operation and did not make
any attempts to change the business to make it profitable; (2)
the taxpayers did not have or seek expert advice as to
making the tree farm profitable; (3) although the taxpayers
spent a considerable amount of time and work on the farm,
most of the effort was not involved with the tree raising or
selling part of the operation; (4) the taxpayers failed to prove
how much appreciation in the property and trees had
occurred or would occur to offset the losses; and (5) the
taxpayers had not successfully operated any other similar
business. The other factors of Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) were
held to be neutral on this issue. Zarins v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 2001-68.
INCOME . The taxpayer received a portion of the
taxpayer’s wages in payments made directly from the
taxpayer’s employer to the taxpayer’s landlord for rent. The
employer did not withhold any taxes from these payments.
The taxpayer claimed these rent payments as nontaxable
earned income. The taxpayer argued that the taxpayer should
not have to pay any taxes on the payments because no tax
was withheld by the employer. The court held that the
taxpayer was liable for the tax on the wages, whether or not
any amounts were withheld by the employer. Zarcharias v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-67.
The taxpayer was self-employed as a cosmetologist. The
IRS assessed an income tax deficiency for underreported
income based upon deposits made to the taxpayer’s bank
accounts. The taxpayer did not produce full and accurate
records of the business to support the income reported on the
income tax return. Except for an adjustment for interaccount
transfers, the IRS determinations based on the bank account
deposits were upheld by the court. Hintze v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 2001-70.
IRA . During 1995, the taxpayer was employed by an
employer which provided a pension plan. The employer sold
the business to another company which terminated the
pension plan in 1996. The taxpayer rolled over the vested
amount in the plan to an IRA in 1996. The taxpayer made
contributions to the IRA in 1995 and claimed a deduction for
the contributions. The taxpayer argued that the taxpayer had
orally terminated participation in the employer’s plan in
1995 but the court did not believe the taxpayer and held that
the taxpayer was an active participant in the employer’s
pension plan and was ineligible for a deduction for
contributions to an IRA. Hodder v. Comm’r, T.C.
Summary Op. 2001-33.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF TAX . The taxpayer
had nte ed into an agreement to pay back taxes in monthly
installments. As part of that agreement, the taxpayer agreed
to pay 20 percent of income monthly as estimated tax
paym nts for each year. The agreement provided that if the
2  p rcent payments exceeded the actual amount owed for a
tax year, the excess payments were applied against the back
taxes. In 1997, the taxpayer made the 20 percent payments
and filed a timely return, claiming a refund. However, the
IRS audit produced a tax liability for 1997. The taxpayer
argued that the 20 percent payments were sufficient to cover
the increased tax liability for 1997. The IRS, however, had
applied the excess to the back taxes based on the taxpayer’s
original return. The court held that, under the installment
agreement, once the taxpayer filed a return, the amount of
excess estimated tax payments was determined and applied
to the back taxes. The court also held that the taxpayer could
not recover the excess estimated payments to pay the current
tax liability once the excess payments were applied to the
back taxes. McKoin v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-62.
INTEREST . The taxpayers entered into a lease of a
residence and the lease contained an option for the purchase
of the r sidence. A portion of the lease payments was to be
c edited toward the purchase price if the option was
exercised. The taxpayers decided not to exercise the option
because of repairs which the owner failed to complete.
However, the taxpayers continued to pay the monthly lease
amounts. Eventually, the taxpayers purchased the residence
by assuming the mortgage. The taxpayers claimed mortgage
interest deductions for the time the residence was leased to
the . The court held that the interest was not deductible
because the taxpayers were not obligated on the mortgage
until it was assumed as part of the purchase. Blanch  v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-63.
LEGAL EXPENSES . The taxpayer had claimed various
legal expenses as business deductions. The IRS
recharacterized the expenses as capital expenses and
disallowed the current deduction for the expenses. The court
held that the legal expenses were to be capitalized because
the taxpayer failed to provide evidence of the nature and
purpose of the expenses. Bello v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2001-56.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES . The taxpayer owned land
whi h was to be sold to a nonprofit conservation
organization. The organization agreed to participate in a
like-kind exchange using a third party accommodator. The
accommodator purchased the replacement property using
borrowed funds and funds provided by the taxpayer. While
the accommodator held the property, the property was leased
to the taxpayer until the exchange was authorized by the
organization. The main issue was whether the accommodator
was an agent of the taxpayer such that the exchange would
not qualify for like-kind exchange treatment. The IRS used
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the six factors of National Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner,
336 U.S. 422 (1949) to determine the status of the
accommodator as to the taxpayer. The IRS ruled that the
accommodator was not the agent of the taxpayer because the
accommodator (1)  operated a separate business, (2) was not
contractually authorized to bind the taxpayer by any action
of the accommodator, (3) did not transfer money to the
taxpayer; (4) had a written lease with the taxpayer; (5) was
not owned by the taxpayer; and (6) had a business purpose
separate from the exchange of the properties. Ltr. Rul.
200111025, Dec. 8, 2000.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in February
2001, the weighted average is 5.89 percent with the
permissible range of 5.30 to 6.19 percent (90 to 106 percent
permissible range) and 5.30 to 6.48 percent (90 to 110
percent permissible range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice
2001-20, I.R.B. 2001-__.
The taxpayer was a retired teacher. During employment as
a teacher, the taxpayer made after-tax contributions to a
pension plan. These contributions formed a tax basis in the
pension plan which was allocated ratably to each year
distributions were made after the taxpayer’s retirement. The
taxpayer argued that the basis from these contributions
should be increased to reflect the amount of inflation which
occurred after the contributions were made. The court held
that the taxpayer’s basis in the pension plan could not be
increased for inflation because there was no authority in the
statute or regulations for increasing basis because of
inflation. Nordtvedt v. Comm’r, 116 T.C. No. 13 (2001).
RETURNS. The IRS has announced the use of automatic
telephone and e-filing extension requests and approval. The
phone requests can be made at 1-888-796-1074 and requires
information from the taxpayer’s 1999 return. The e-filing
request can be made through e-filing services and also
requires information from the 1999 return. IR-2001-37.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer held a
25 percent interest in an S corporation which had discharge
of indebtedness income. The corporation was insolvent and
filed for bankruptcy; therefore, the discharge of indebtedness
income was excluded from the corporation’s income under
I.R.C. § 108(a). The taxpayer increased the stock basis by
the taxpayer’s share of the discharge of indebtedness
income. The Tax Court cited its holding in Nelson v.
Comm’r, 110 T.C. 114 (1998), to hold that discharge of
indebtedness income excluded from an S corporation’s
income was not passed through to the shareholders to
increase the basis of stock. The appellate court discussed the
several decisions on both sides of the issue and held that an
S corporation must first use any untaxed discharge of
indebtedness income to reduce tax attributes at the corporate
level before passing through any remaining discharge of
indebtedness income to shareholders. In this case, the
corporation had suspended losses which completely offset
the discharge of indebtedness income, leaving no discharge
of indebtedness income to pass through to the shareholders.
In addition, the offset suspended losses were not passed
through to the shareholders. After ruling in Gitlitz v. United
States, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,147 (S. Ct. 2001),
see p. 15 supra, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari,
vacated and remanded this case. This case has been further
remanded by the Circuit Court of Appeals for decision in
light of Gitlitz. Gaudiano v. Comm’r, 2001-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,278 (6th Cir. 2001), on rem. from __ S.
Ct. __ (2001), rem’g and vac’g, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,559 (6th Cir. 2000), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1998-
408.
SHAREHOLDER BASIS. The taxpayers were the
shareholders of an S corporation which wanted to build a
new furniture showroom. The corporation applied to a bank
for a construction loan but was unable to provide sufficient
collateral for the loan. The taxpayers provided a guarantee of
the corporation’s loan by providing personal assets as
additional collateral. The taxpayers argued that, because the
bank would not have made the loan to the corporation
without the guarantee, the loan, in substance, was made to
the taxpayers and reloaned to the corporation. The taxpayer
sough to include the loan in their basis in the corporation in
order to claim pass-through operating losses. The court
refused to recharacterize the loan as made to the taxpayers
because the taxpayers failed to show that the corporation had
no ability to repay the loan. Jackson v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 2001-61.




AFR 4.63 4.58 4.55 4.54
110 percent AFR 5.10 5.04 5.01 4.99
120 percent AFR 5.58 5.50 5.46 5.44
Mid-term*
AFR* 4.94 4.88 4.85 4.83
110 percent AFR* 5.44 5.37 5.33 5.31
120 percent AFR*5.95 5.86 5.82 5.79
Long-term
AFR 5.43 5.36 5.32 5.30
110 percent AFR 5.99 5.90 5.86 5.83
120 percent AFR 6.53 6.43 6.38 6.35
Rev. Rul. 2001-17, I.R.B. 2001-15.
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY INCIDENT TO
DIVORCE . The taxpayer received an interest in real
property under a property settlement as part of a divorce.
The divorce decree required the taxpayer to pay a sum of
money to the ex spouse and that monetary award was
secured by the real property received by the taxpayer under
the divorce decree. The taxpayer sold the property and used
most of the proceeds to satisfy the monetary obligation to the
former spouse. The taxpayer did not include any of the gain
from the sale in income, arguing that the sale was made “on
behalf of” the former spouse and excludible under Treas.
Re . § 1.1041-1T(c), Q&A-9. The court noted that the
former spouse had no obligation to the purchaser of the
taxpayer’s property; therefore, the sale was of no benefit to
the spouse but was used by the taxpayer solely to satisfy an
obligation of the taxpayer to the former spouse. The court
held that the gain from the sale was included in the
taxpay r’s income. Olsen v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op.
2001-32.
TRAVEL EXPENSES . The IRS has released the
applicable terminal charges and the Standard Industry Fare
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Level (SIFL) mileage rates for use in determining the value
of noncommercial flights on employer-provided aircraft
taken from January 1, 2001, through June 30, 2001. The
terminal charge is $35.84, and the SIFL mileage rates are: up
to 500 miles, $0.1961 per mile; 501-1,500 miles, $0.1495
per mile; and over 1,500 miles, $0.1437 per mile. Rev. Rul.
2001-13, I.R.B. 2001-__.
NEGLIGENCE
LEVEE. The plaintiff’s decedent had drowned when the
decedent’s car became trapped in flood waters on a highway
near the defendants’ farms. The defendants had constructed
levees near the road to prevent flooding of their farms during
heavy rains. When the accident occurred several inches of
rain had fallen and the decedent was driving at night. The
levees were constructed higher than the road surface such
that the road would flood before the farms. The defendants
argued that the levees were reasonable in that the levees
were needed to prevent flooding. The evidence
demonstrated, however, that in most years levees built to a
height just below the road surface would have protected the
land. The court held that building the levees above the
roadway was not reasonable because the defendants could
easily foresee that the levees would cause road flooding
which would be dangerous to drivers. The court held that it
was not reasonable to value crops and land over human life.
The defendants also argued that the heavy rains on the
evening of the accident were an intervening cause of the
plaintiff’s decedent’s death. The court applied a “but for”
test in holding that, but for the levees, the water would not
have covered the highway when the decedent was driving on
it; therefore, the levees were a direct and foreseeable cause
of the accident and the decedent’s death. Robinson v. State
Highway & Transportation Comm’n, 24 S.W.3d 67 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2000).
NUISANCE
DAIRY. The plaintiff had purchased an operating dairy
located in the defendant city. The city’s residents near the
plaintiff complained about offensive odors coming from the
dairy and the plaintiff constructed a waste water treatment
facility in the dairy but the odors and complaints continued.
The defendant eventually refused to reissue the plaintiff’s
business license on the basis that the dairy was a nuisance
under the defendant’s nuisance ordinance. The plaintiff
argued that Utah Code § 78-38-5 protected it from any
actions for nuisance. The court held that the statute protected
manufacturing operations which had been in operation for
more than three years, which were not nuisances when
begun and which had not changed their operation before the
nuisance complaints were raised. Because the plaintiff had
not changed its operations and had not been in operation for
three years before the nuisance complaints, the court held
that the statute did not protect the plaintiff from nuisance
claims. The court also upheld the defendant’s authority to
estab ish a nuisance ordinance. Dairy Product Services v.
City of Wellsville, 13 P.3d 581 (Utah 2000).
PRODUCT LIABILITY
HERBICIDE. The plaintiff was a cotton farmer with a
farm neighboring the defendant’s farm. The defendant
purchased herbicide and hired another defendant to apply the
herbicide by air. The plaintiff argued that the herbicide was
negligently applied so as to drift on to the plaintiff’s fields
and damage the plaintiff’s crops. The neighbor argued that
the action was pre-empted by FIFRA but the court held that
the neighbor was not a supplier or manufacturer; therefore,
the neighbor was not protected by FIFRA from negligence
suits. In addition, the court held that the action did not
involve the label of the herbicide but was concerned with the
application as directed by the label. The neighbor also
argued that the applicator was an independent contractor;
therefore, none of the claimed negligence could be attributed
to the neighbor. The plaintiff argued that an exception to the
independent contractor rule applied because the application
of herbicide was inherently dangerous. The court held that
aerial crop spraying is inherently dangerous in circumstances
where spray drift may occur. The court held that the
neighbor was liable for negligence of the applicator because
the neighbor was aware that the weather conditions would
make the aerial spraying dangerous for the plaintiff’s crops.
The amount of damages was calculated using USDA crop
reports from the area. Foust v. Estate of Walters, 21
S.W.3d 495 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
TRESPASS
TIMBER. The parties owned neighboring rural land and a
dispute arose over the boundary line when the plaintiff
constructed a home on the plaintiff’s property. The parties
agreed to have the properties surveyed using the plaintiff’s
deed, although the defendant disagreed with the resulting
survey. The defendant then proceeded to have another
survey done using the defendant’s deed. The survey
produced a different boundary line and, based on that
survey, the defendant removed trees from the disputed area
between the properties. The plaintiff sued for the loss of the
trees and the trial court awarded double the value of the trees
removed from the plaintiff’s property. The appellate court
affirmed the award, holding that the plaintiff’s surveyor used
more reliable monuments and deed descriptions in surveying
the properties. The court also held that the plaintiff was not
entitled to treble damages because the defendant reasonably
relied on the second survey and had no intention of
removing trees belonging to the plaintiff. Mix v. Miller, 27
S.W.3d 508 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
CITATION UPDATES
Carlson v. Comm’r, 116 T.C. No. 19 (2001) (discharge
of indebtedness) see p. 46 supra.
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The Agricultural Law Press presents
2001 AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
   May 8-11, 2001  Airport Holiday Inn, Denver, CO
   June 19-22, 2001  Ramada Conference Center, Columbia, MO
   July 31, August 1-3, 2001  Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle, PA
   October 2-5, 2001  Interstate Holiday Inn, Grand Island, NE
Come join us for expert and practical seminars on the essential aspects of agricultural tax and law. Gain insight and
understanding from two of the nation’s top agricultural tax and law instructors.
The seminar are held at each site on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Registrants may attend one, two,
three or all four days, with separate pricing for each combination. On Tuesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch
income tax. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl will cover farm and ranch estate planning. On Thursday, Roger McEowen will
cover farm and ranch business planning. On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover current developments in several other
areas of agricultural law. Your registration fee includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended
which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small
additional charge. A buffet lunch and break refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities,
self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income
averaging; earned income credit; commodity futures transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Federal estate tax, including 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts, alternate
valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), marital deduction planning, disclaimers,
planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, trusts, and generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability
companies.
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and
environmental law.
Special room discounted rates are available at each hotel for seminar attendees.
The seminar registration fees   for current subscribers    (and for multiple registrations from one firm) to the Agricultural
Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law are $180 (one day), $345 (two days), $500
(three days), and $650 (four days).  The registration fees for    n subscribers   are $200, $385, $560 and $720, respectively.
Please Note: the registration fees are higher for registrations within 20 days prior to the seminar, so please call for
availability and the correct fees. More information and a registration form are available online at www. grilawpress.com
For more information, call Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail to robert@agrilawpress.com
